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RESÜMEE
Der China-Feldzug der britisch-französischen Truppen von 860 endete zwar mit einer Nie-
derlage für China, leitete aber gleichzeitig eine neue Phase der diplomatischen Beziehungen 
zu den Westmächten ein. Die vorliegende Untersuchung der während des Krieges geführten 
politischen Verhandlungen zeigt, dass es zu Annäherungen kam, indem beide Seiten die diplo-
matischen Gepflogenheiten und Systeme des jeweils anderen zu erkennen trachteten und in 
einem transkulturellen Prozess in die Fortführung der Verhandlungen integrierten. Damit wird 
der traditionellen Deutung dieses Ereignisses als Meilenstein des europäischen Imperialismus 
eine neue Dimension hinzugefügt: Das chinesische System der Außenbeziehungen war wie 
das europäische sehr flexibel, und auch die „informal empires“ mussten stets neu verhandelt 
werden.
The China War of 1860 (or the “China expedition”, as it was called by British and French 
participants in their memoirs) changed the mode of negotiation between China and the 
European powers forever. In this war, lasting from August to October 1860, British and 
French allied troops were deployed in the north of China, reaching the gates of Beijing. 
European powers demanded not only the further opening of several more treaty ports 
on the coast of the Qing Empire, but also permission to establish European embassies in 
Beijing in order to gain direct access to the court. 
The Qing government finally was forced to come to terms with the fact that the Western 
foreigners were no longer content to be confined to the southern borders of the empire, 
subject to the power of provincial governors, and now were insisting on negotiating with 
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the power holders in Beijing directly. The China War of 1860 was the last chapter and 
the pinnacle in a series of conflicts and struggles between China and the Western powers 
that started in 1839 with the First Opium War and continued with the Second Opium 
War in 1856–1858. The Treaty of Tianjin was negotiated to conclude the Second Opium 
War and was meant to be ratified in 1859. After the Qing reconsidered, then seemingly 
rescinded the treaty and forcibly repulsed the British and French ratification party’s ac-
cess to Beijing in 1859, inflicting a military defeat, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, who had 
already led the negotiations in 1857/8, were sent with troops again to China to demand 
again the ratification of the treaty. In 1860, all tools of the Qing diplomatic system, 
according to which the elites of the Qing Empire had hitherto conducted their foreign 
relations, seemingly had failed. The Western allies were threatening the capital with their 
army and had caused the emperor to flee. In October 1860, British forces looted and 
burned the Yuanming Yuan, at the time one of the world’s most beautiful garden ensem-
bles, an act that speaks for itself. 
In the end, the European allies were granted their demands in the Treaty of Beijing (con-
cluded on October 24 and 25 of 1860), which granted them a considerable extension 
of their privileges in China, among them the opening of several more treaty ports and 
permission to establish embassies in Beijing, allowing a close and direct observation of 
Qing politics. 
The China expedition of 1860 has usually been interpreted as another milestone of Brit-
ish and French imperialism in China on the way to China`s subjection by the Eight-
Nation Alliance in 1900 during the Boxer rebellion.1 I do not contest this narrative. 
However, it is my contention that the diplomatic negotiations that accompanied the 
military actions of the allied armies also ushered in a new stage in the diplomatic rela-
tions between China and the Western powers, in which China was left with some room 
for agency and self-determination. Although the Chinese government, for the first time 
directly confronted in their own capital, had to come to terms with a Western system of 
diplomatic relations, its negotiators did not remain passive; instead they actively grasped 
the new conditions and even integrated several practices and techniques from the foreign 
system into their own and then used these transcultural elements to establish common 
ground between the Western powers and the Qing Empire.
The figure behind this strategy was Prince Gong (Yixin), who was forced to conclude the 
negotiations with the British and French after his brother, the Xianfeng Emperor, left 
Beijing and fled to Chengde. One illustration of Qing adaptation and agency was the 
foundation, in the aftermath of the China War of 1860, of the Zongli Yamen in Beijing, 
 For the China expedition of 860 analyzed within the parameters of imperialism, see J. Hevia, English Lessons: 
The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China, Durham 2003, and L. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The 
Invention of Modern China in Modern World Making, Cambridge 2004. A detailed analysis of the whole conflict 
beginning in 857 in Canton is provided by J. Y. Wong, Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism and the Arrow War 
(856–860) in China, Cambridge 998.
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an institution with the sole aim of getting to know and manage exclusively all affairs in 
connection with Europeans and other Western foreigners.2 
What about the British and the French? Both Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, who served 
as heads of their respective British and French missions, knew from the negotiations in 
1857/8 what to expect in China. Although the ultimate act of burning the Yuanming 
Yuan would not lead one to suspect it, the fact is that Elgin, as head of the British diplo-
matic mission, had received orders to act carefully: British China policy forbade any co-
lonial adventures on Chinese soil in order to prevent it from becoming a second India.3 
On the other hand, he had to take care not to be subjected by the Chinese government to 
what he perceived as their “traditional diplomatic customs”, but rather to act as an agent 
of a British Empire which desired to be treated on even footing with the Qing Empire. 
France had given her diplomatic representative, Baron Gros, almost the same instruc-
tions as Lord Elgin, but Gros often had to follow Elgin‘s suggestions and leads since 
British forces outnumbered the French, and the French China policy was not nearly as 
clearly defined as the British. Despite their alliance during the expedition, Britain and 
France each followed more or less their own agenda and goals in China, particularly 
with respect to their “civilizing mission”: the British heralded free trade and Christian 
missions, while the French sought to establish itself as the protective power of Catholic 
missionaries and the Catholic Church in China. 
In what ways, then, did the Western allies have to come to terms with the Chinese diplo-
matic system, appropriate it, and even integrate elements of it in a transcultural process? 
Additionally, in what ways did Britain and France follow their own agenda, and what 
were the repercussions?
I thus argue, the situation of war and violence notwithstanding, that an “appropriation” 
of some sort took place on both sides. All parties concerned had to come to terms with 
each other’s negotiating strategies, and had to integrate foreign elements into their dip-
lomatic negotiations in a process of “transcultural acknowledgment”. From this point 
of view, and under the auspices of a theory of “entangled history”, a new perspective 
can be added to the history of Western involvement in China if we ask what both sides 
gained from their mutual engagement.4 The aftermath of the China War of 1860, for 
example, points to an agreement of some kind, since British troops supported the Qing 
government in defeating the Taiping rebels who were threatening the government in the 
south.5
2 One of the best studies about the founding of the Zongli Yamen is still M. Banno, China and the West 858–86. 
The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen, Cambridge 964. The Zongli Yamen was dissolved in 90 and replaced by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which finally really heralded in China’s emergence as a political entity with a way to 
conduct its foreign affairs corresponding with an international (meaning Western) standard of diplomacy that 
had developed during the nineteenth century.
3 J. Osterhammel, China und die Weltgesellschaft. Vom 8. Jahrhundert bis in unsere Zeit, München 989, p. 52.
4 For theories of entangled history, please refer to S. Conrad      / S. Randeria (eds.), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Post-
koloniale Perspektiven der Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaft, Frankfurt a.M. 2002, Introduction.
5 This is the conclusion of Stephen Platt, who claims that the Qing were saved through Zeng Guofan’s provincial 
military on the one hand and haphazard foreign intervention of the British on the other: S. Platt, Autumn in 
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I additionally argue that the different systems of diplomatic customs, or rather the dif-
ferent modes of conducting relations with the outside world, were not fixed entities, but 
rather were flexible, negotiable and renegotiable, particularly in situations of crisis and 
war as during the China expedition of 1860. Thus we have on the one side the system 
of the Qing Empire, which during the eighteenth century had analyzed and managed its 
heterogeneous frontier areas successfully according to changing political circumstances. 
In the nineteenth century, after a time of decline, the Qing Empire had to come to terms 
with a transformation from “frontier policy” to “foreign policy” as well as with the fact 
that it was no longer the sole contender for political power in the East, but rather was 
locked in competition with other entities, like Britain.6 
On the other side were the ambitious and powerful British and French empires, allied 
here yet differentiated by slightly different motives, who acted as representatives and 
agents for free trade and the Christian mission in China. How did they come to terms 
with the diplomatic system of the Qing Empire? Which points were open to discussion, 
which points could not be discussed?
Although the Zongli Yamen is not the topic of this paper, if we consider an approach 
of entangled history between China and the Western powers and ask whether there 
were common interests between them, then we can also ask whether the Zongli Ya-
men as a platform of communication between Western and European diplomats was 
indeed forced on the Chinese government by the British and French, or whether it was 
established as an addition and a new instrument by the Qing Empire to a foreign policy 
undergoing transformation.7
It is the aim of this paper to disentangle the diplomatic negotiations between the allies 
Great Britain and France and the Qing Empire in order to show how they respectively 
perceived and acted upon mutual diplomatic systems and strategies. This will be under-
taken in three steps. Firstly, the position of departure applying to all concerned parties 
will be determined in the form of a comprehensive “worldview”, the outlook of each 
party on its own system of state and politics and position in the world, its cultural prac-
tices with regards to the conduct of foreign affairs, and eventual political factors taking 
place during the negotiations (e.g. power struggles among different factions at the Qing 
court).
A second section describes crucial moments of the diplomatic negotiations that shed 
light on actual self-perceptions or on perceptions of the others. Finally, in my conclusion 
I describe the results of the negotiations and evaluate the mutual process of appropria-
tion in comparison to the point of departure. This analysis relies mainly on materials 
found in British and French archives, as well as from eyewitness accounts that appeared 
the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War, New York / London, 202, p. 
525. 
6 This is the argument of M. W. Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Trans-
formation of Geopolitics in Qing China, Stanford 203, p. 3, on which I will elaborate elsewhere.
7 Jennifer Rudolph also argues in this direction: J. Rudolph, Negotiated Power in Late Imperial China: The Zongli 
Yamen and the Politics of Reform, Ithaca 2008, p. 3.
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in Europe after the China War. The Qing court’s perspective has been reconstructed from 
the Chinese correspondence found in British and French archives, as well as from the 
Chouban yiwu shimo (Complete Records on Managing Foreign Affairs).
The worldview and cultural set-up of the Qing Empire in 1860:  
Foreign relations, state and military
Theories of how the Qing Empire conducted its relations with the outside world have 
changed during the last few years. Until recently, John King Fairbank`s theory of a “Chi-
nese world order” served as a general framework to explain the Chinese worldview and 
the management of foreign relations during the Ming and Qing eras. This Chinese world 
order was, according to Fairbank, founded on a sinocentric ideology, with the emperor 
at the apex, and designed to enforce this hierarchy on foreign peoples. According to 
this thinking, the only possible relationship with the emperor of China was that of a 
“tributary”.8 The Chinese emperor had several modes of conduct towards foreign peoples 
that he used to “convince” them of this world order. First, of course, there was military 
enforcement by an almost invincible army, and second, a system of bureaucratic regula-
tions which was taught to and then exercised by the headmen of non-Chinese peoples, 
for instance, in the southwest. A third mode was the rule of virtue, in which the emperor, 
as the sage Son of Heaven, exercised a normative influence and thus impressed his su-
periority. Finally, for all foreigners who were out of reach geographically and culturally, 
the Chinese emperor was very skilled in the art of manipulating by means of material in-
terests. Among the strategies employed against these foreigners were permitting trade or 
giving gifts (in particular the cupidity of Western foreigners was well-attested), keeping 
them at the border of the empire or using a strategy of playing out “one barbarian against 
another”. This collection of institutional procedures made up the “tributary” system. This 
also meant that the rulers and officials had an a priori system of categorizing and man-
aging foreign peoples and, according to Fairbank, did not require a clear knowledge of 
the outer world, that is, about the conditions among the tributary peoples or with each 
other. There have always been difficulties with the application of Fairbank’s model of a 
sinocentric world order to the Qing Empire, since it has long been recognized that Qing 
policy toward Inner Asia differed significantly from that towards the European maritime 
empires and hints at a rather flexible scheme. But over the last twenty years, thinking on 
the empire’s foreign relations has been undergoing reformulation.9 The result is that the 
Qing dynasty’s Manchu rulers, whose vision was seemingly unclouded by sinocentric as-
sumptions, can be shown to have been using logistical, technological and administrative 
innovations similar to the state-building projects carried out by European and Russian 
8 D. Twitchett / /J. K. Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 0, Late Ch‘ing, 800–9, Part , Cam-
bridge 978, pp. 30ff.
9 Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy (6), p. 7.
32 | Ines Eben v. Racknitz
governments of the same era. These Manchu rulers perceived the world surrounding 
them as consisting of a multitude of rulers and sought to make themselves “overlords” 
by analyzing and managing each according to its own political circumstances, develop-
ing a number of geopolitical strategies to maintain their top position as unifiers of the 
empire.10 From the leaders of the central Asian peoples they demanded recognition of 
the superiority of the Qing emperor while maintaining their freedom to rule locally. 
New artificial ethnic identities were created, and high local governmental posts were 
given to local princes while a variety of religious belief systems were integrated into their 
own.11 Another strategy was the decentralization of power and the forging of loyalty not 
to a “China” (which was only one part of the Qing Empire) but to the ruling family of 
the Aixin Gioro.12 The Qing Empire thus was multicultural, multiethnic and multilin-
guistic. This achievement still came at the heavy price of vast military expeditions in 
order to subject the peoples of central Asia. One must, however, assess the Qing rulers 
as well-versed and open to what can be called “transcultural techniques” in integrating 
new systems of governance to consolidate their power.13 European merchants and traders 
(represented in powerful trading companies) were during the eighteenth century limited 
to the port of Guangzhou, where a number of Chinese merchants (Cohong merchants) 
were specially licensed by the emperor to trade with them.14 Until the end of the eight-
eenth century, the Europeans integrated themselves into the Chinese system without 
protest. Once the conquest or integration of a foreign people had been completed, how-
ever, the daily routine was handled similar to the way described by Fairbank’s model of 
a Chinese world order.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the situation had changed, and the Chinese 
government was faced with a multitude of problems.15 Due to the long period of peace 
during the Qianlong era in the eighteenth century, many structural problems had devel-
oped that had not yet been properly met and confronted during the Xianfeng era (1850–
1861).16 Among them were, first of all, rapid population growth (increasing from 100 
to 450 million people during the Qianlong era), an overexploitation of natural resources 
and serious flooding in central China. Secondly, the expansive and expensive military 
0 J. L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 793, Durham 995, p. 32.
 This foreign policy has been identified by proponents of the New Qing History as typical for the Manchu em-
perors. The New Qing History is best characterized in a review: J. Waley-Cohen, The New Qing History, in: Radical 
History Review, 88 (2004), pp. 93-206. 
2 Foret claims that the architectural design of the imperial retreat at Chengde, where the tributary missions du-
ring the eighteenth century came to pay their respects, reflects this foreign policy. See Ph. Foret, Mapping 
Chengde, The Qing Landscape Enterprise, Honolulu 2000, pp. 4ff.
3 P. K. Crossley / H. F. Siu / D. S. Sutton (eds.), Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern 
China, London 2006, pp. 3ff.
4 P. A. van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade, 
Hong Kong 20, pp. 2ff.
5 For an overview of the Jiaqing and Daoguang eras, see S. Mann Jones / P. A. Kuhn, Dynastic Decline and the 
Roots of Rebellion, in: Fairbank (ed.), Cambridge History of China, vol. 0 (8), pp. 07-62.
6 The term “Xianfeng” describes the motto of the government of the emperor. Accordingly, Qianlong and Kangxi 
are not the personal names of these emperors, but just the names of their reigns. 
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expeditions of the eighteenth century, undertaken by the Qianlong emperor in order to 
consolidate the empire, had caused a serious financial crisis in the nineteenth century. 
Local protests against the government were channeled into religious movements, which 
developed everywhere in China, the most serious of them being the Taiping rebellion 
in the south of China.17 The founder of the Taiping rebellion, Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全 
(1814–1864), saw the reigning Manchu dynasty as the cause of China’s abysmal situa-
tion and attracted followers from all strata of society. This enabled him to build a force-
ful army as well as a capable administration for his “Kingdom of Heavenly Peace”, the 
Taiping Tianguo. In 1850, Hong had 20,000 followers, and from 1853 onward Nanjing 
became the capital of the steadily growing movement (by 1853 its members numbered 
60,000).18 
Rebellions also arose in the imperial border regions of the Empire from peoples who 
demanded independence from Qing rule and voiced discontent with the rulers; in con-
sequence, the tributary system eroded. Moreover, European merchants, who had been 
confined to the southern borders of the Empire until 1842, caused unrest among the 
Chinese population and additionally demanded access to the capital and additional 
rights not compatible with a traditional tributary system.19 The Qing army during the 
1850s had only limited capacity to defend the interests of the Qing government and to 
maintain peace since it was dispersed throughout the empire. But although a certain 
“outdatedness” of military technology has been noted, it would probably still have been 
able to defeat the Europeans in 1860 if commanded properly.20
Matthew Mosca has recently demonstrated that since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, the Qing elites were well aware that they had to face several challenges to their 
mode of conducting relations with the outside world. Far from being oblivious to the 
world outside their realms, archival records show that the Qing court was informed in at 
least the outlines of most military engagements fought in the Empire’s vicinity, including 
those of India, as well as about the major conflicts carried out in Europe and among the 
European empires.21 This was also reflected in the scholarship of the period, in which 
connection one could mention the works of Wei Yuan, published in 1844 under the 
title Haiguo tuzhi (Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms), which is a compilation 
of all available knowledge on the interests of the Western European states in Asia, and 
7 Among the religious uprisings were the Nian rebellion (85–868) in the north, the Muslim-Panthay rebellion 
(855–873) in Yunnan and Guizhou, and the White Lotus uprisings in southern China.
8 In the end (during the mid-860s), the Taiping were not able to deprive the Qing of their power for several 
reasons, which became apparent only after 860. At the end of the 850s, however, with the Europeans ap-
proaching fast from the coast, the Taiping rebels still posed a threat to the Qing.
9 Although some of the religious rebellions arose due to the inability of the Qing government to keep the We-
stern foreigners in check. See F. Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorders in South China, 839–86, 
Berkeley 966, which deals particularly with the protest of the local population against the British in Canton.
20 This was suggested by R. Horowitz, Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 850–
9, in: D. Graff / R. Higham (eds.), Military History of China, Boulder 2002, pp. 53-74, here: p. 73.
2 M. W. Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy (6), p. 0.
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which exerted considerable influence at the Qing court during the 1850s.22 Wei Yuan 
also demanded a modernization of the military and projects to gather knowledge about 
the impressive Western military technology.
The Qing government was also aware of the fact that the rising British Empire was in-
volved in most geopolitical struggles from Southeast Asia throughout the Indian subcon-
tinent and to Afghanistan. But unlike European empires, which were about to develop a 
“grand strategy” including all tools of international negotiation and communication, and 
judging their crises on a global scale, Qing statesmen had their interests atomized across 
a range of discreet frontiers, while intelligence gathering was limited to threats in the 
immediate border areas. This frontier-based approach prevented Qing statesmen from 
piecing together a big picture of the geopolitical situation of the Qing Empire in total; 
here the culprit was not a sinocentric worldview, but rather a different perspective. Over 
time, at least some Qing observers shifted to a new perspective.23 Observing the rise of 
the British on the borders of the Qing Empire from 1750, the ruling elites realized that 
they had to shift from a “frontier policy” to a “foreign policy”, and that they had to come 
to terms with the fact that they were not a solitary empire but one of several large entities 
locked in competition.24
The divided Qing court in 1860
Although the Qing observers who realized what was at stake were a rather small faction 
at the Qing court, they nonetheless developed a more modern strategy to be employed 
against the allies. The European empires were still not easy for the Qing to assess, but 
during the 1850s it had become clear that, since the Opium War and the conclusion of 
the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, they had decided to support the Qing government against 
the Taiping rebels.25 Behind this strategy were obvious economic interests: European 
traders were aware that the Taiping leaders wanted to prohibit the opium trade and so 
they tried to convince the Qing government to legalize the trade by helping to keep the 
Taiping threat at bay. This help, however, was not gladly accepted by the imperial court 
in Beijing, where opinion about the Europeans and their mounting aggression towards 
the Qing government was divided. The Qing court at large and its head, the Xianfeng 
Emperor, adhered to a philosophical school of thought that sought reform and revitaliza-
tion as the focus of internal politics and thus turned away from foreign politics and ne-
22 Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi, 50 vols., Peking 844. Wei Yuan died in 856 and the influence of his work did not extend 
beyond his death. Jane Leonard demonstrates, however, that this work was a compilation: J. Leonard, Wei Yuan 
and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World, Cambridge 984.
23 M. W. Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy (6), p. .
24 Ibid., p. 3.
25 J. Spence, The Search for Modern China, New York 990, p. 77.
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gotiations particularly with the Europeans, whose influence they dreaded and resisted.26 
The European allies recognized this and called this faction “the war party”.27 
Another, much smaller political faction (among them, until his death, Wei Yuan) saw the 
solution for the numerous problems of the Qing government in the opposite attitude. 
They believed that an orientation towards the Western powers, an attempt to learn about 
their motives and strategies, and an integration not only of new ways of thinking but also 
of their technologies, would stabilize the Qing Empire. These thinkers were impressed by 
the performance of the British army and their technological and military skills demon-
strated during the confrontation of the First Opium War in Guangzhou in 1842, when 
the Chinese were for the first time confronted with the very efficient British gunboat.28 
It was when this party, headed by Prince Gong, took over negotiations that the Treaty of 
Beijing could be concluded.
The worldview of the British and the French empires in 1860
History and background
Rather than being a unified West, Great Britain and France, although they seemingly 
acted in China as allies, had very different concepts of their empires and thus had dif-
ferent visions for their mission in China. British peace and prosperity in the 1850s de-
pended largely on foreign trade. Between 1841 and 1872, overseas exports quadrupled, 
free trade enjoyed almost unconditional support and most contemporaries were of the 
opinion that these were the preconditions for all development and progress worldwide.29 
To secure and continue this development for the British, commodities had to be import-
ed from overseas and manufactured goods had to be exported and sold on the overseas 
markets. The wish for free access to the large markets in Asia thus became one of the 
most important points in British foreign politics in the 1840s, with China coming more 
and more into focus. 
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the political framework of Chinese-Brit-
ish encounters had changed. Traders in eighteenth-century China, confined to Canton, 
had obeyed local rules and directed their protests to the local governors of Canton. This 
changed with the abolition of the trade monopoly of the East India Company (EIC) in 
China. Until 1833, the EIC represented the interests of British traders in China and was 
endowed with certain privileges of sovereignty and thus was able to conclude treaties 
26 P. Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure 796–864, Cam-
bridge 979, pp. 35ff.
27 M. Banno, China and the West (2), p. 60.
28 See also M. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T‘ung-Chih Restoration, 872–874, Stanford 
957; D. Pong, Shen Pao-chen and China’s Modernization in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 994; P. A. 
Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China, Cambridge 970. Already Lin Zexu had taken measures 
after the defeat in 842 to learn from the foreigners and their technology by founding a translation bureau.
29 F. Trentman, Free Trade Nation: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain, Oxford 2008, p. 7.
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with foreign princes.30 When the trade monopoly of the EIC in China was abolished 
in 1833 in favor of free trade, Chinese traders demanded that a new representative be 
named for the European traders. London therefore sent an envoy who represented the 
European traders in China on behalf of the British Crown.31 This envoy had to mind 
the reputation of Great Britain and her sovereign, and any assault on British traders or 
British subjects worldwide could now de jure be regarded and interpreted as an insult 
to the British Crown. Whereas the EIC had been able to handle any assault on one of 
their members flexibly, any assault on subjects of the British Crown could in theory be 
seen as a diplomatic incident. But in practice, the aim of British China policy was not to 
strive for political power, but rather to create (e.g. by manipulating the indigenous elites) 
“informal empires” rather than formal colonial rule. These informal empires were rather 
loosely defined, but they meant means of control without taking over actual political 
power. Their establishment was justified by the British demand for free trade (which was 
perceived as underlying all trade systems worldwide) and the establishment of a British 
judicial system for British or, in the beginning, for other Western subjects, and by the 
demand for free Christian missions in the country. 
As for France, it was the goal of Napoleon III during the 1850s to return his country 
to its former splendor. Great Britain was France’s great rival in Europe and the two 
countries were several times at the brink of war due to this rivalry. France had emerged 
successfully from the Crimean War in 1857 and had demonstrated to all other European 
powers that it possessed a good army as well as a remarkable economic infrastructure 
and industry. In terms of foreign trade, possession of colonies and worldwide presence, 
however, France was no match for the British Empire. Its reconstruction of a colonial 
empire had begun only in the 1830s with the annexation of Algeria. With respect to its 
civilizing mission, Napoleon III not only had a system of free trade in mind to serve his 
empire, but was also eager to promote and accelerate the process of Christianization and 
“civilization” worldwide, an ambition which was critically eyed by his adversaries. In 
Asia, French interests were directed towards Indochina rather than China. In the 1850s, 
French influence in Vietnam consisted primarily of the Catholic Church founding mis-
sions in the name of France, rather than active French politics of economic expansion.32 
French and British rivalries in Europe notwithstanding, they acted together whenever it 
was necessary outside of Europe to defend European political and trade interests.33
30 See Christina Brauner’s contribution in this volume.
3 An excellent characterization of the preconditions of Britain’s imperialism can be found in J. Osterhammel, China 
und die Weltgesellschaft (3), pp. 37ff.
32 F. Quinn, The French Overseas Empire, Westport 2000, pp. 07ff. See also N. Cooper, France in Indochina: Colonial 
Encounters, Oxford 200, p. 3.
33 R. Tombs / I. Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun-King to the Present, London 
2006, describes the history of Great Britain and France, particularly their rivalry in the nineteenth century in full 
detail.
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The British and French armies and the conduct of a European diplomacy
In 1860, both the British and the French China expedition forces were equipped with 
the latest technological standards and perceived by the Chinese armies as superior to 
themselves.34 The British army had the advantage of more experience in the conduct 
of colonial wars, particularly in Asia. The experience abroad of the French army of the 
Second Empire was confined to Algeria and a short stint in Vietnam, but their guns and 
other technological armament impressed the Chinese government nevertheless. In terms 
of diplomatic negotiations, both Britain and France justified their aggressive style by 
their respective civilizing missions, consisting of the economic policies of free trade and 
the spread of Christianity. In the later stages of their negotiations with China, both Euro-
pean powers claimed to be acting in accordance with an “international law”.35 Although 
it is not easy to define international law, the question is particularly difficult within a 
colonial context in the nineteenth century. For Europeans, this system of international 
law was supposed to regulate the conduct of European diplomacy and was, as the nine-
teenth century progressed, perceived as underlying political systems worldwide. All states 
with a European-defined “standard of civilization” were subject to this law, while the 
others were “uncivilized”.36 This line of thinking made it possible for the European states 
to attack or invade political entities on the grounds that these were refusing European 
“civilization standards” and free trade. 
Judging by Lord Elgin’s negotiation strategies in 1860, the European powers themselves 
found international law difficult to determine. The creation of an international law in 
the nineteenth century stemmed from the attempt to create a legal basis for the relation-
ship with the world outside Europe, and it can even be argued that the interaction with 
the “colonized” was crucial for its genesis.37 Verena Steller`s paper, also in this volume, 
shows that the adaption of the English rule of law in India has to be told as a story of in-
teraction, relation and entanglement, and that the transposition of English law to India 
was by no means a simple transition, but rather a very complex process of “dis- and re-
embedment”. This same term could be applied to the situation in China in 1860, where 
Elgin introduced the concept of international law only towards the end of negotiations, 
when the safety of hostages had to be negotiated, and with sketchy detail. He seems to 
have been more concerned with the reaction of the British public than the attitude of 
the Qing negotiators.38
34 D. R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York 
98.
35 R. Horowitz, International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the 
Nineteenth Century, in: Journal of World History, 5 (2005) 4, pp. 445-486.
36 B. Bowden, The Colonial Origins of International Law: European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civi-
lization, in: Journal of the History of International Law, 7 (2005), pp. -23, p. 2. Bowden quotes G. W. Gong, The 
Standard of “Civilization” in International Society, Oxford 984, p. 3.
37 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Ithaca 2002, p. 3.
38 N. Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal 
Order, in: The European Journal of International Law, 6 (2005) 3, pp. 370-408. This created the contradictory 
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In the eighteenth century, and here I would like to draw a parallel to Christina Brauner’s 
paper,39 diplomatic agents, missionaries and trading companies believed in a shared po-
litical framework and concepts of empire and power; the Asian state system was accepted 
as “equally just” and acting according similar beliefs and values.40 In the nineteenth cen-
tury this had considerably changed: China was perceived in Europe as a stagnant society 
and Asian nations and rulers as “despotical” (with parallels to Christina Brauner’s find-
ings in the case of Dahomey). Since they were no longer envisaged as powers correspond-
ing on the same levels as European societies in values and culture, and seemingly refused 
to become part of the “family of nations”, warlike actions were considered appropriate in 
order to raise their standard of civilization.41
Within the societies of Great Britain and France, the inequality between states in the 
colonial context was known. The humanitarian catastrophe of the Crimean War as well 
as the Indian Mutiny had been photographed (both by the same photographer, who also 
took pictures from the China expedition from 1860, Felice Beato) and reported in news-
papers, and thus information was available to a shocked European public.42 There were 
many opponents of the “small wars” that were carried out in the name of free trade and 
civilization outside of Europe, the most prominent in the case of the China expedition 
of 1860 being Victor Hugo. The public in Europe was very well aware of the injustices of 
this presumed international law, and voices of protest were often raised against it.
The China War of 1860: Historical background, events and actors
The Opium Wars consisted of violent clashes between Western powers and the Qing 
government over trading privileges and diplomatic representations, whereby the ques-
tions of trading privileges always took precedence over diplomatic representation. For 
the expanding British Empire, the closed Cohong system and the system of licensed 
merchants in Guangzhou, although accepted in the eighteenth century, was now in the 
nineteenth century a provocation; it was only a question of time before a war would 
break out. In the First Opium War (started in 1839 by the destruction of opium on a 
British vessel by special commissioner Lin Zexu, who had been dispatched by the em-
peror to stop the opium trade), Great Britain and France demanded retribution for the 
destroyed opium as well as the opening of more ports on the Chinese coast for Western 
trade. Both demands, as well as an indemnity, were granted in the Treaty of Nanjing in 
situation where, on the one side, the claim to act in accordance with international law helped a strong state to 
enforce the demands of a weaker state, but on the other side prevented it from taking over total control.
39 C. Brauner in this volume, p. 99-23.
40 J. Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht, Stuttgart 984, p. 482.
4 This argument is central to Hevia’s interpretation of the pedagogical intention of an “informal empire”. J. Hevia, 
English Lessons (), p. 4. Gerrit Gong claims this “standard of civilization” caused most of the clashes in the nine-
teenth century.
42 Ch. Herbert, War of No Pity: The Indian Mutiny and Victorian Trauma, Princeton 2008, claims that the Indian 
Mutiny and its atrocities were greatly exaggerated in the British press. 
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1842. The clashes between the Western traders and the Chinese government continued 
over the following years, the Europeans demanding continuous improvement of their 
conditions, local administration always declining their requests. A small conflict in 1856 
(which developed into the Arrow War or the Second Opium War) was finally used by 
Great Britain and France as a pretext for the dispatch of a large contingent of military 
troops to solve these conflicts and demand more privileges: diplomatic representation in 
Beijing, the opening of seven more treaty ports, as well as free inland travel in China for 
European traders and Christian missionaries. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros represented 
Great Britain and France respectively as diplomats, and were explicitly given permission 
to use military force if necessary. Russian and American diplomats backed the British 
and French negotiations but had been instructed by their respective governments to 
solve the conflict peacefully.43 From April of 1858, the negotiations were held at the 
Dagu Forts. During this time, Elgin and Gros not only made the acquaintance of the 
Qing negotiators, but also became acquainted with the Qing diplomacy, concepts and 
strategies that they would all encounter again later during the China expedition of 1860. 
To name just a few of these, first the Qing court tried to keep the problem at the bor-
ders of the empire by sending provincial officials to negotiate, in consequence of which 
Elgin and Gros broke off the negotiations and occupied the Dagu Forts. Also, the Qing 
government opposed the demands for a diplomatic representation in Beijing as well as 
free inland travel for European traders and Christian missionaries. The attempt to draft 
a single reply from all the Western powers together to this answer almost caused a rift 
between the Westerners. 
The United States and Russia were inclined to give in, abandoning the demand for dip-
lomatic representation, but Elgin insisted on it, which put the Qing negotiators under 
pressure. In response, the Qing delegates Guiliang and Huashana tried to defuse the 
negotiations with a double-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they tried to convince 
the Qing court to accept the European demands, advancing several arguments for this 
purpose: the political situation was very difficult, and the military superiority of the Brit-
ish and French had been proven on several occasions. On the other hand, they tried to 
convince Elgin and Gros to abandon their demands. 
In the end a compromise was reached between both sides: the Qing government agreed 
to allow free inland travel for traders and missionaries, but only with special passports. 
Also, the Qing granted the right of diplomatic representation, but demanded that the 
British and French only make use of this right one year later, in 1859, a condition which 
the allies gladly accepted. Although a contract was signed to this effect at the end of June 
1858, the Qing court (now headed by the war party, which feared that the foreigners 
43 For a description of the Second Opium War, see H. B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 
90 reprint Taipei 97, vol. 2:  The Period of Submission, 86–893, London / New York 90,, pp. 489-538 
[reprint Taipei 97]. For Russian and American interests, see R. Quested, The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 
Kuala Lumpur 968, and E. Swisher / K. Rea (eds.), Early Sino-American Relations, 84–92, Boulder 977.
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would gain insights too close into Qing politics if they were in Beijing) reopened nego-
tiations later in 1858 and attempted to rescind the contract.44 
The Qing court was offering to remove all taxes for merchants in exchange for the annul-
ment of the points that were the most important for the British: diplomatic presence in 
Beijing and free inland travel on the rivers as well for Christian missionaries. 
Lord Elgin declined this proposal but made a conciliatory counteroffer by promising to 
suggest to his government that they not exercise the right to permanent representation 
in Beijing, provided that the treaties would be respectfully ratified and exchanged in the 
following year and all other conditions fulfilled.45 
The government in Beijing was still alarmed by these arrangements since its main goal 
was to avoid any situation that would jeopardize the balance of power and the authority 
at the Qing court. In order to keep the foreigners out of the city, they offered to exchange 
the treaties in Beijing, but Guiliang objected, correctly, that the British would never ac-
cept this. Thus, the Qing government issued an edict on March 29, 1859, stating that 
Beijing would be a possible site for the treaty ratification. To this was attached the condi-
tion that the European entourage would consist of no more than ten people, and that 
they should arrive by sea and travel by a route suggested by the Qing court. The carrying 
of weapons would not be allowed, nor even transport in a sedan chair. After the negotia-
tion of the contracts, the envoys should return home as soon as possible.46 General Seng-
gerinchin would be responsible for the protection of the foreigners.47 
British and French representatives found it advantageous to pretend not to be aware of 
all these developments in Beijing and refused further communication with the Qing ne-
gotiators. They were determined to carry out the ratification as agreed upon with Elgin 
and Gros. The reasoning behind this strategy, from the inconclusive hints available in all 
the source materials, may have been that the British and the French had a concept of a 
Chinese tributary system after all. The route suggested by the Qing court as well as the 
instructions according to which the foreign envoy was to be equipped resembled very 
closely those of the Korean tributary missions. Such treatment was completely unac-
ceptable to Great Britain and France. Frederick Bruce, younger brother of Lord Elgin, 
accompanied by M. de Bourbolon, French representative, sailed in June 1859 to Tianjin 
with the intention of traveling to Beijing, bearing the “autographs“ (meaning treaties 
with the Queen’s signature) of the Queen and the authorization to act as Her Majesty’s 
representative.
The British and French warships were attacked by Qing troops at the Dagu Forts and 
defeated. Frederick Bruce, having lost 432 men, returned to Shanghai a beaten man. He 
was further embarrassed by the fact that the American envoy John Ward, having obeyed 
the instructions of the Qing Empire, was granted a treaty on August 16, 1859, and a 
44 See in addition H. Cordier, L’expédition de Chine; histoire diplomatique, notes et documents, Paris 906, p. 8.
45 M. Banno, China and the West (2), p. 28.
46 Ibid., p. 29.
47 P. Crossley, The Manchus, Cambridge 997, p. 62. A short biography in A. W. Hummel (ed.), Eminent Chinese of 
the Ch‘ing Period, Washington 944, vol. 2, pp. 632-634. 
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Russian treaty was concluded as well.48 Ward had been treated like any tributary mission 
and was chided for that by the British, but in any event he had concluded the treaty.
The news of Bruce’s behavior in Shanghai did not meet with full approval in London 
and was highly criticized. There were even voices who suggested that Bruce should also 
have traveled on the route of John Ward.49 In the end, however, the situation prompted 
the governments in Great Britain and France to dispatch a new expedition, with orders 
to ratify the Treaty of Tianjin, if necessary by force, and to extract an apology from the 
Qing government.
This allied China expedition, consisting of roughly 17,000 soldiers (only British and 
French, since the American envoy was watching in the first days from a distance, and the 
Russian envoy was acting as an intermediary between the Chinese and Western allies) 
appeared in August of 1860 at the Dagu Forts, and remained for roughly twelve weeks 
on Chinese soil, attaining, after a series of battles and fierce negotiations, their goal of 
treaty ratification and indemnity. 
London made the goal of this mission quite clear to Lord Elgin, who was appointed 
as diplomatic representative, as well as to Hope Grant, the commander of the military 
troops: they were to extract an excuse for the “unexpected” defeat in 1859, a financial 
indemnity for the damage of the ships in 1859, and the ratification of the treaties of Bei-
jing. A military confrontation should be avoided in order not to further weaken the Qing 
government. If a military clash was unavoidable, it should be restricted to the vicinity of 
the original incident.50 Elgin’s mission was quite ambivalent: on the one hand, he was 
instructed to employ peaceful means; on the other, it was impressed on Elgin that it was 
important not to disturb the emperor since his flight from Beijing would have disastrous 
consequences. A military confrontation thus had to be avoided; the armies were solely 
for the protection of the diplomatic staff.51 Hope Grant, as a general and military com-
mander, had to follow Lord Elgin’s instructions.
The French general de Montauban and the French diplomat Baron Gros had received 
similar objectives from their government: extraction of an excuse, the demand of an 
indemnity, and the ratification of the treaties. Unlike the British case, however, and 
according to the memoirs of General de Montauban, the French diplomatic representa-
tive (i.e. Baron Gros) was subordinate to the military command (i.e. Montauban).52 
Queen Victoria and Emperor Napoleon III were of the opinion that the war had to be 
limited to North China, and the British and the French received instructions to put their 
rivalries aside and act together. The Chinese government personnel, in contrast to the 
British and French negotiators, were very diverse. Beijing first dispatched the governor 
of Northern Zhili, Hengfu, to negotiate. During the later stages of the war, and when it 
48 D. L. Anderson, Imperialism and Idealism. American Diplomats in China, 86–898, Bloomington 985, p. 2, 
describes this as a defining moment of the young American foreign policy.
49 W. Costin, Great Britain and China, 833–860, Oxford 937, p. 294
50 Sidney Herbert to Hope Grant, January 9, 860, London, in Foreign Office (FO) 405/5, pp. -3.
5 Russell to Bruce, January 3, 860, in FO 88/847
52 Ch. G. Montauban, Souvenirs du Général Cousin de Montauban, Cte. De Palikao, Paris 932, p. 8.
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became clear that Elgin and Gros were demanding to deal with high-ranking imperial 
officials, Hengqi, Wenxiang and Guiliang were dispatched, all of whom had already had 
negotiated with Elgin and Gros in Canton. Prince Yi Zaiyuan, uncle of the emperor, 
represented the Imperial Family alongside Muyin, the minister of war; Yi Zaiyuan was 
later replaced by Prince Gong Yixin, the younger brother of the Xianfeng Emperor, who 
concluded the negotiations. The Chinese military troops, allegedly numbering 30,000 
men, were commanded by General Sengerrinchin, a Mongol, who already had fought 
successfully against the Nian rebels.
The diplomatic negotiations between Great Britain / France  
and China during the China Expedition of 1860
The first phase of the China expedition, August 1 to September 8, 1860
The plan of the allies was clear: the China expedition was supposed to have two stages. 
The first stage had the character of a punitive expedition. The Dagu Forts were to be 
captured in retaliation for the defeat from 1859. The allies were then to move forward 
to Tianjin, demand an apology for the defeat inflicted by the Qing army in front of the 
Dagu Forts in 1859, as well as an indemnity and ratification of the treaty, if necessary by 
force. In the second stage, it was hoped that no military action would be needed. Only 
the diplomatic envoys Lord Elgin and Baron Gros were meant to proceed onward to 
Beijing, with the troops being left behind in Tianjin. 
The Qing government’s actions and strategies against the allies were planned and car-
ried out from August 1 until September 21 by the faction that the allies called the “war 
party”. This party was backed by the Xianfeng Emperor and consisted of Princes Hui, 
Yi and Cheng, who, emboldened by the victory of 1859, argued for a continuation of 
the aggressive strategy against the foreigners.53 The Qing government took notice of the 
disembarking of foreign troops on August 1. Apparently unaware of the heightened state 
of aggressiveness of the British position, the orders of the emperor were to maintain 
peace, and General Sengerrinchin was ordered not to attack. The plan was (and Elgin 
only learnt this later when a pack of letters, found at the Xinhe Forts on August 13, had 
been translated) to negotiate with the foreigners peacefully and perhaps subsequently 
enlist their help in defeating the Taiping rebels.54 The Qing government pretended to 
consider the European demand for indemnities for the damages inflicted in 1859 as the 
53 Princes Yi Zaiyuan, Hui Mianyu, Cheng Tuanhua. Prince Yi is mentioned in A. W. Hummel (ed.), Eminent Chinese, 
vol. 2 (47), p. 924. Prince Hui (84–865) is mentioned as the fifth son of the Jiaquing emperor, and direct supe-
rior of Senggerinchin, in: ibid., p. 968. 
54 The letters were found at the conquered Xinhe Fort. For a translation of these letters refer to Foreign Office 
405/5, pp. 47ff. Also, Banno believes that Senggerinchin, who was perceived by the Europeans as rather bel-
ligerent and the culprit behind all the attacks on Europeans during the China expedition, was actually quite 
peaceful. M. Banno, China and the West (2), p. 76. Translation of an official communication between provincial 
governor Hengfu and De, commander of the forts, found later in Xinhe, in FO 405/5, p. 36. 
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principal point (rather than the demand for diplomatic representation), and the emperor 
signaled his intention to give in on this matter. All the other initial reactions of the Qing 
government to the sudden Western presence in August 1860 can be interpreted within 
the framework of a tributary system, in which the Western foreigners were categorized 
as culturally and geographically arriving from outside the realm. The government’s first 
strategy was to attempt to restrict the problem to a local matter concerning relations 
with the foreigners, and thus assigned the provincial governor of Beizhili, Hengfu 恆
福, with the task of communicating with the foreigners. Hengfu’s responsibility was to 
find out the demands of the foreigners and to suggest that they take a special designated 
route to Beijing. Hengfu seemed unaware of the warlike attitude of the allies and enlisted 
the help of the American and Russian envoys John Ward and Nikolai Ignatiev, whose 
countries already had treaties with the Qing Empire. Ward and Ignatiev appeared in the 
French and British camps to notify the allies of Hengfu’s messages: Hengfu assured Elgin 
and Gros that they would have free access to Beijing if they agreed to take the route pre-
scribed by the Qing government. He also made it clear that the conflict concerned Great 
Britain and China, and that France had no part in it.55 Elgin, suspecting renewed foul 
play, refused all communication and declined to respond to this overture to negotiate 
with Hengfu. Instead, he responded that his first task was to seek revenge for the defeat 
of 1859 by attacking the forts.56 Additionally, and with respect to the diplomatic nego-
tiations, he demanded to negotiate with imperial envoys only, not with the provincial 
governor, and declined to negotiate on the behalf of France, which should be addressed 
separately.57 Elgin’s response can be explained from his previous experiences with the 
Qing negotiators. It is clear also from his private correspondence that he had no inkling 
of a tributary system. 
Elgin and Hope Grant retained the original plan of attack, and in the beginning every-
thing went according to plan: the allies succeeded in capturing all the forts guarding the 
mouth of the Peiho (i.e. Baihe) River leading from the Bohai Sea to Beijing. Between 
August 9 and 14, they took the forts of Xinhe and Tanggu. On August 19, Governor 
Hengfu attempted one last time to avert the dreaded military attack on the Dagu Forts, 
explaining that Chinese troops would be withdrawn and the way to Beijing up the river 
cleared if European troops would stop the hostilities. He further signaled the intention 
of his government to acquiesce to Elgin’s and Gros’ request to negotiate only with impe-
rial delegates, and for that reason announced the arrival of two imperial envoys, Hengqi 
and Wenxiang, in Tianjin. Wenxiang, explained Hengfu to Elgin and Gros, was one of 
55 Hengfu to Elgin, August 9, FO 405/5, p. 29. The diplomatic negotiations have been reconstructed from a mul-
titude of materials from the National Archives (Foreign Office [FO], War Office [WO]) in London and archives in 
Paris. For the reconstruction of the Chinese side, I have used published source materials: Chouban Yiwu shimo, 
Beijing 979, Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan (ed.), Yuanming yuan qingdai dangan shiliao, Shanghai 99, 
2 vols., and Y. Shen (ed.), Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan xubian, Taibei 963, as well as the Chinese letters 
written to Lord Elgin and Baron Gros by Prince Gong (FO 682/993).
56 Hengfu to Elgin, FO 405/5, p. 29.
57 Elgin to Hengfu, August 8, 860, FO 405/5, p. 3.
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the highest-ranking diplomats, along with Hengqi, and thus the European diplomats 
would no longer be dealing with provincial-level officials. From the Qing government’s 
perspective, there thus ought to be no further obstacles in the signing of the treaties.58 
But Hengfu’s efforts were to no avail since the British and the French needed to punish 
the Qing government for the embarrassment from the previous year. On August 21, the 
south and north Dagu Forts fell into the hands of the allies. Two thousand Chinese sol-
diers were killed along with their commander.59 Between August 22 and August 31, the 
allies marched to Tianjin and quartered their troops there. Governor Hengfu wrote to 
Lord Elgin and Baron Gros on August 23 that he expected them in Tianjin to conclude 
the treaty, along with Wenxiang 文祥, Hengqi 恆祺 and Guiliang. Now that the defeat 
of 1859 had been avenged, Elgin and Gros became more outspoken with the Chinese 
negotiators and stated their demands.
Baron Gros, using the opportunity to gain a favorable position with the Qing govern-
ment and to distinguish himself from the British, demanded an apology for the defeat 
in 1859 and the immediate signing of the Treaty of Tianjin, an exchange of treaties in 
Beijing, and their choice of means of transport. He also reduced his indemnity demands 
to 8 million taels, much less than before, reasoning that the Chinese government was 
in a difficult situation with the Taiping rebels and apparently wishing to accommodate 
the government.60 Elgin demanded more: eight million taels indemnity, and additional 
money for the damage inflicted on the British troops by the defeat in front of the Dagu 
Forts in 1859. He affirmed his demands, emphasizing the gains the Chinese government 
could obtain through a treaty with the Westerners, by pointing to the fact that the Taip-
ing rebels in Shanghai had been defeated successfully with the help of the Europeans.
Meanwhile, in Beijing, the Qing court was shocked by the defeat on August 21, as well 
as by Elgin’s unbending demands. They feared that the allies would directly march to 
Beijing and would even demand an audience with the emperor, an unthinkable circum-
stance. The “war” as well as the “peace parties” both had to consider Senggerinchin’s 
suggestion that the emperor should pretend to make an annual hunting trip to Chengde 
and thus escape the possible sack of Beijing. 
All hope rested on Guiliang and his negotiations with Elgin. On September 2 he wrote 
to Elgin that as imperial commissioner he was authorized to ratify the treaties in Tianjin. 
Afterwards, the diplomatic mission could proceed to Beijing, without guns and with 
58 Wenxiang and Hengqi were well known to Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. Hengqi had already negotiated with Elgin 
on behalf of the Chinese government in 858, and came to Beijing in the summer of 860 to become the direc-
tor of the imperial arsenal. In an imperial edict from August 6, he had been ordered to Beitang to accompany 
the British and French envoys. Wenxiang (88–876) was considered even by the Europeans to be one of the 
ablest statesmen of the Qing. A. W. Hummel (ed.), Eminent Chinese (47), pp. 853-855.
59 For a detailed account of the events, see War Office (WO) 32/8232, Napier to Sidney Herbert. See also H. Cordier, 
L’expédition de Chine (44), pp. 263ff. H. Knollys, Incidents in the China War of 860 compiled from the private 
journals of General Hope Grant, Edinburgh 875, pp. 92ff, and R. Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campai-
gn of 860, London 86, pp. 4ff. The pictures of photographer Felice Beato are shown in D. Harris, Of Battle 
and Beauty. Felice Beato‘s Photographs of China, Santa Barbara 999, pp. 63ff.
60 H. Cordier, L’expédition de Chine (44), p. 277.
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only a small entourage, during which time European troops should cease all hostilities.61 
Elgin responded that he would prepare a treaty within the next few days, sign it, and 
then march towards Beijing to exchange the treaties. Elgin had so much experience now 
with Qing policy and changing strategies that he did not want to order the troops to 
stop the hostilities yet, since this might give Qing officials a feeling of security. Thus, he 
added that hostilities would cease only after the signing of the treaties as a strategy to 
secure their signature.
Both parties believed that it was only a matter of days until the China expedition was 
over, and the date for the ratification of the treaties was set for September 8. But to the 
disappointment of all parties involved, the negotiations had to be broken off on Sep-
tember 8. This failure was attributed to the fact that commissioners Hengqi, Wenxiang 
and Guiliang failed to produce sufficient written authorization from the imperial gov-
ernment.62 The authorizations of Guiliang were sufficient only to ratify the treaties, not 
enough to grant indemnity and an excuse for the defeat of 1859.63 Elgin and Gros thus 
assumed that the Chinese government was causing strategic delays to keep the Europeans 
in the country during the long and cold northern Chinese winter. They were also afraid 
that the Qing soldiers whom they had released from captivity after the sacking of the 
Dagu Forts would be gathering in and around Tongzhou and become a serious enemy 
once more.64 The Qing negotiators, on the other hand, were seriously afraid that the al-
lies would march on Beijing and sack the city. Their promises to deliver the additional 
imperial authorizations were in vain: Elgin and Gros were determined to march towards 
Beijing. As a last chance for the Chinese government, Elgin and Gros demanded that 
Guiliang himself come to meet Elgin and a small detachment of troops in Tongzhou on 
the way to Beijing and ratify the treaty there.65 
The second phase of the China expedition, September 8 to September 21
To recapitulate the mutual concessions and appropriations made by each party to the 
other’s diplomatic mode during the first phase: Lord Elgin and Baron Gros went ahead 
and had the Dagu Forts conquered as retaliation for Bruce’s defeat in 1859. From their 
own perspective, they had acquired the right to do so with the successful negotiations in 
1858, which, with the attack on Bruce, the Qing government apparently had not hon-
ored. But the Qing government had agreed to sign the treaties in Tianjin, after which 
Lord Elgin and Baron Gros would travel with only a small entourage to Beijing to ex-
change the treaties. On the other side, the Qing government understood the necessity 
of having the treaty signed by a direct envoy of the emperor, realizing that other “dip-
lomatic framings” of their own tributary system were necessary, and acted accordingly 
6 Guiliang to Elgin, September 2, 860, in FO 405/5, p. 87ff.
62 Elgin to Russell, in FO 405/5, p. 96.
63 Elgin to Hope Grant, September 8, Tianjin, in FO 405/5, p. 200.
64 Ibid.
65 Elgin to Guiliang, September 7, Tianjin, in FO 405/5, p. 99.
46 | Ines Eben v. Racknitz
by sending Guiliang, a high official. The negotiations had to be broken off because the 
Qing government was still seemingly attempting (in Elgin’s eyes) to deceive the allies by 
not delivering the full authorizations. Guiliang had been unaware of this, or at least pre-
tended to be unaware of his authorizations being insufficient, but Elgin suspected that 
here was another trick to avoid recognizing the Western empires on equal terms. Thus, 
he declined to give Guiliang the time he needed to produce the written authorization, 
and the signing of the treaty failed. Guiliang’s efforts have to be seen in the light of the 
two parties he negotiated for: the Qing government feared the direct confrontation of 
the emperor with Elgin and Gros, the humiliation of an apology for an action that they 
considered to be correct (1859) and the recognition of the Western allies as equal, all of 
which would be against their traditional notions of diplomacy. The Europeans, on the 
other hand, could not accept Guiliang’s compromise since they were really striving for 
equal recognition by the Qing.
The second phase sees two major military confrontations and ends with the flight of the 
emperor to Chengde (disguised as an annual hunting trip). In order to put pressure on 
the Qing government, but also out of sheer necessity because now a long-term provision-
ing for the army had to be organized, the civil population became involved: villages were 
destroyed and food was confiscated. Official communications, declaring the intentions 
of the Chinese government and the allies respectively, were distributed in the form of 
posters that were pinned on the walls of official buildings.66 The strategy of making use 
of Guiliang had failed, and the Qing court realized that the Europeans would negoti-
ate only with imperial envoys. The Qing court dealt with this precondition and subse-
quently sent members of ministries and of the imperial family to negotiate with the Eu-
ropeans: Elgin and Gros received news on September 11 that new negotiators had been 
appointed, namely Prince Yi Zaiyuan, an uncle of the Xianfeng Emperor, and Muyin穆
陰, secretary of war. They were on their way to Tianjin to enquire about the difficulties 
with the negotiations and asked Elgin and Gros to return to Tianjin and await further 
instructions.67 The strategy of “benevolence” and accommodation had failed, and Prince 
Yi and Muyin were humiliated by the necessity to meet with the foreigners. Meanwhile, 
members of the war party used other “traditional techniques”: they threatened Elgin and 
Gros by pointing out that the Qing troops might attack if the allied troops advanced any 
further, and that the Qing cavalry far outnumbered the European allies.
Elgin and Gros refused to take notice of the new Qing strategies and marched towards 
Tongzhou, but started to negotiate with Prince Yi before they arrived in Tongzhou. Elgin 
had to abandon his original plan of delaying negotiations, firstly owing to the military 
situation: British general Hope Grant had pointed out that an occupation of Beijing 
had to be planned very carefully and that he needed more time, his troops not yet being 
ready. The second reason had to do with diplomatic strategy: Elgin was well aware that 
Prince Yi was a key figure at the imperial court and he hoped that the prince needed no 
66 Edict of Zaiyuan and Muyin, in: Chouban Yiwu shimo (55), p. 235.
67 Elgin to Russell, September 6, Hexiwu, in FO 405/5, p. 2. 
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further imperial authorization, making it possible to sign the treaties directly in Tong-
zhou. But he was still aware that he had to be careful in order not to scare the emperor 
into leaving Beijing, and that Prince Yi was not likely to alter his view on the European 
foreigners, negotiating only within the framework of the tributary system and using 
force to keep them away from Beijing. Elgin thus decided (after the “misunderstandings” 
in Tianjin with Guiliang) to prevent all misunderstandings by transmitting a message to 
Prince Yi via his accomplished translators Harry Parkes and Thomas Wade: he, Elgin, 
demanded only the ratification of the treaty of Tianjin and a compensation for the losses 
from 1859, and wanted in no way to threaten Qing power. Elgin then added that he 
would not come to Beijing if his presence was unnecessary; he understood this to be a 
very important point for Chinese negotiators.68
Prince Yi met with Harry Parkes and Thomas Wade in Tongzhou at the Yamen. Prince 
Yi, for whom it must have been an unusual experience to be interviewed by two lowly 
translators, politely opened the negotiations and demanded to know the nature of Elgin’s 
objections. Parkes explained that it was not quite clear to Elgin who actually was in 
charge of the negotiations and whether they had the authority to negotiate in the name 
of the emperor and the imperial government, or whether they were again only provincial 
governors acting on their own accord. Prince Yi did not make any attempt to explain 
Chinese concepts of authority, but seems to have understood that dealing with Europe-
ans required an imperial envoy of a certain standing. Thus he replied and explained that 
he, an imperial prince, would manage the negotiations. He apologized for Guiliang’s 
behavior from September 5, characterizing it as incompetent and due to old age. Then, 
Harry Parkes explained to Prince Yi the meaning of this “letter of legitimation” and 
explained that in the last version some key elements had been left out, among them the 
right to a diplomatic representation in Beijing, a key demand of the European envoys. 
Prince Yi agreed to bring a corrected version of this letter of legitimation, although his 
status as an imperial prince should convince the foreigners (who had explicitly demand-
ed an imperial prince) that he could sign all treaties on behalf of the emperor.69 But he 
insisted that he would grant only the economic demands of the Europeans, and that the 
Qing government would not allow foreign embassies in Beijing or the opening of the 
port of Tianjin to European trade.70 
Harry Parkes and Thomas Wade, experienced Chinese translators and negotiators who 
were well acquainted with Chinese strategies of double negotiations, explained later that 
it was their belief that Prince Yi was only pretending to object to their demands, as dic-
tated by Chinese protocol, but would (much like Guiliang) try to find a solution. This 
impression was clearly wrong. Archival documents show that Prince Yi had the intention 
not to yield to the foreigners or to treat them as if on the same level, but instead to deal 
with them according to traditional diplomatic strategies. Prince Yi pretended to interpret 
68 Wade to Elgin, September 23, 860, Baliqiao, in FO 405/5, pp. 23-26.
69 Prinz Yi and Muyin to the throne, in: Chouban Yiwu Shimo (55), p. 2307.
70 Ibid., pp. 2303-2304.
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the Western demands solely as economic interests and was prepared, in order to recog-
nize these interests as the central demand, even to pay indemnity for the defeat in 1859. 
From his perspective, as a Chinese prince accustomed to receive tribute missions, these 
were magnanimous concessions; on the other hand, he needed to stop the foreigners 
from proceeding to Beijing and thus took threats related to this question very seriously.71 
British and Chinese negotiators agreed that Elgin should come to Tongzhou, and that he 
and Prince Yi would once more discuss how he would proceed to Beijing. Negotiations 
between the French representatives and Prince Yi on September 15 produced similar re-
sults. Meanwhile, another crisis was starting to unfold, this time in the military sphere.
Rather than withdrawing, the Chinese army was collecting in and around Tongzhou, 
obviously at Prince Yi’s command. Parkes and Wade were able to observe the battle 
preparations underway. The emperor had given instructions to keep the European troops 
away from Beijing, or at least not to let them cross the bridge at Baliqiao, close to Beijing. 
In the end, it was decided that, rather than letting the allies into Beijing, the Qing army 
should attack in the vicinity of Tongzhou and drive the European forces away.72 
The sources do not provide conclusive results regarding who ordered the abduction of 
thirty-two British and French officers on September 18 (among them the almost indis-
pensable Harry Parkes and Times correspondent Thomas Bowlby), but this event was 
later used by Elgin as the pretext for burning the Yuanming Yuan.73 It also destroyed 
the trust of Elgin and Gros in Prince Yi and his integrity as an imperial prince and 
heightened the aggressiveness of the military troops, who sought revenge for this further 
humiliation. Two open battles fought on September 18 and 21 at Baliqiao, which were 
won against a Qing army of 30,000 cavalry troops, cleared the way to Beijing for the for-
eign troops, and the British and French began to plan to sack the capital of the Chinese 
empire.74 The emperor and his entourage of 4,000 men, expecting the worst, left Beijing 
hastily on September 21.75 Prince Yi, hostile to the European powers, left with the impe-
rial retinue, leaving Prince Gong, half-brother of the emperor, in charge. On him alone 
now rested the task of dealing with the expected foreign attack on the city of Beijing. 
The second phase had shown that both sides were still negotiating on different premises: 
Prince Yi realized that the foreigners would never agree to diplomatic relationships with 
the Qing Empire in tributary style. Thus, he continued to treat the problem as if it were 
solely economic in nature and insisted on refusing foreign representations in Beijing. His 
only concession to the foreigners was a letter of legitimation, which had apparently not 
been customary in previous Qing relations with foreigners. Elgin and Gros for their part 
had made it clear that what they needed was to ratify the treaties and extract an apology, 
and they would even waive the voyage to Beijing – that was the extent of the concessions 
they would make. They would not abandon the question of diplomatic representation.
7 Prince Yi and Muyin to the emperor, September 4, 860, in ibid., pp. 2303-2304.
72 Edict of the Xianfeng Emperor, in: Xianfeng Tongzhiliang Chaoshang shangyu dang, Guangxi 2002, p. 498.
73 Elgin to Russell, September 23, 860, Baliqiao, in FO 405/5, pp. 26ff.
74 Hope Grant and Sidney Herbert, in WO 32/8233. Ch.-G. Montauban, Souvenirs, pp. 277-280.
75 M. Banno, China and the West (2), p. 7.
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The third phase of the China expedition, September 22 to October 25 
Prince Gong Wang Yixin 恭王奕訢, now negotiating on behalf of the absent emperor, 
was the younger half-brother of the Xianfeng Emperor and the head of the “peace party” 
which favored relations with the foreigners. However, this by no means meant that his 
relationship with the foreigners was relaxed or amicable. 
In addition to the failed negotiations, the abducted European officers, the fled emperor 
and the two big battles, the European diplomats were under considerable pressure as 
winter was approaching and European troops were badly equipped. Elgin and Gros 
feared that they would not be able to ratify or exchange treaties, and that they had put 
the Chinese government in serious jeopardy. The urgent wish on both sides was for a 
rapid and peaceful conclusion to negotiations.
The new Chinese plenipotentiary, Prince Gong, twenty-seven years old, certainly enter-
tained no belief in European superiority, and according to some assessments he could be 
considered a traditional Confucian.76 But he had been all of his life an adversary of the 
politics of the Xianfeng Emperor and, influenced by his father-in-law Guiliang, believed 
that good relations with the Western powers and the use of their technology could help 
solve the imminent problems of the Qing dynasty and restore a strong Confucian state. 
But Prince Gong’s first task was to prepare Beijing against an advance of the foreigners.77 
He re-appointed Guiliang, Wenxiang, Hengqi and Chonglun 崇綸 as his advisors for 
their considerable experience in dealing with the foreigners as well as for their belief in 
a peaceful coexistence with them. Chonghou 崇厚, an official from Tianjin, was also 
summoned to assist, as well as Huang Huilian, who had worked since 1858 as an unoffi-
cial “channel of information” between the British and the Chinese.78 Then Prince Gong 
resumed the negotiations with Elgin, notifying him on September 21 that Prince Yi and 
Muyin had not acted in the best interests of China by keeping the foreigners waiting so 
long, and that he was now in charge.79 
Elgin and Gros now had a new problem at hand and replied that the diplomatic ne-
gotiations would be resumed only if all the hostages were returned safely and in good 
health.80 Prince Gong did not consider the hostage issue an important matter for nego-
tiation, and responded that the hostages, though healthy, would be returned only upon 
the signature of the treaty. They, Gros and Elgin, would certainly not want to risk the 
peace between their nations and China on account of the lives of a few men who had 
provoked Chinese troops. Then Prince Gong went on to explain the misunderstandings 
from September 15 from his perspective and as it had been explained to him. The only 
point of disagreement between Prince Yi, Muyin and the British was, according to Prince 
76 M. Wright, Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, The T‘ung-chi Restauration, 862–874, Stanford 857.
77 M. Banno, China and the West (2), p. 7.
78 Ibid., p. 8. Banno states that Prince Gong’s committee was rather extensive and comprised probably fifty-five 
or more people, including Chonglun, sixty-nine years old, in charge of grain supplies for the capital, and Chong-
hou, thirty-three years old, salt commissioner of Tianjin.
79 Prince Gong to Elgin, September 2, 860, FO 405/5, p. 222.
80 Elgin to Prince Gong, September 22, 860, FO 405/5, p. 222.
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Gong’s account, the handover of the treaties between a representative of Queen Victoria 
and the Xianfeng Emperor. In this version, Parkes and Wade had provoked the battle of 
September 18, leading to an argument with Qing officers and resulting in their being 
taken as hostages.81 
Elgin and Gros sent a letter clarifying their point of view, and now employing for the first 
time a notion of “international law” to justify their actions to Prince Gong. It is interest-
ing to note that concepts of international law had not been used before with respect to 
the issue of foreign diplomatic representation in Beijing. But evidently the hostage inci-
dent changed the premises of negotiations, since another peculiarity of diplomacy had 
to be introduced to Prince Gong: the concept of diplomatic immunity. The delegation 
taken hostage on September 18, explained Elgin, had been carrying a white flag. This 
meant that they were sent as diplomatic envoys and were not subject to the laws of for-
eign countries, in this case China.82 The legal corpus justifying Lord Elgin’s reasoning is 
mentioned on September 25, 1860. On this day, Elgin introduced international law into 
the game for the first time, explaining its logic to Prince Gong, who had never heard the 
term. Previously, the concept of international law had not yet, it seems, been deployed. 
The wish for a diplomatic representation in Beijing was understood to be a reasonable 
reaction to the corruption of the Cohong merchants in Kanton. It can be assumed that 
Elgin used the introduction of an international law as a last resort, and also as a manner 
of securing his defense in London. Not only had he failed as commanded to obtain the 
treaties peacefully, but he had also caused the emperor to flee. The taking of the hostages, 
explained Elgin to Prince Gong, was against international law, which guaranteed diplo-
mats immunity from legal action. Also, it was considered a major diplomatic incident 
and sufficient reason for the Europeans to attack Beijing. Additionally, there had been 
another misunderstanding: the personal encounter with the Xianfeng Emperor had al-
ways been negotiable and had never been a precondition. Then Elgin added explanations 
for his behavior, which he had never offered before and which gave Prince Gong insight 
into the European system of diplomacy. Elgin added that the mutual exchange of papers 
of accreditation belonged to a European mode of conduct of diplomatic affairs, but was, 
although highly symbolic, negotiable. However, governments who refrained from engag-
ing in such practices would make themselves vulnerable to the accusation that they did 
not wish to belong to the “family of nations”. Montauban seconded Elgin’s remarks.83
Prince Gong’s response gave no indication that he had any expectations that Elgin and 
Gros would behave in a way expected in China’s tributary relations. In his response on 
September 27 he answered that if Prince Yi and the war minister Muyin had deceived 
Elgin and Gros, then he was very sorry. But he himself was a close relative of the emperor 
and had conceded every single point of negotiations since he wished peace.84 
8 Prince Gong to Elgin, September 23, in FO 682/993/58.
82 H. Knollys, Incidents (59), p. 9.
83 Elgin to Prince Gong, September 2, in FO 405/5, p. 222.
84 Prince Gong to Elgin, September 27, 860, in FO 682/993/60.
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Then he pointed to the contradiction in Elgin’s and Gros’ behavior: the aggressive be-
havior of the European military and their wish to destroy the city was not in accordance 
with their wish for peace and a desire for a harmonious “family of nations”. (It cannot be 
determined whether Prince Gong knew that the concept of Lord Elgin’s family of nations 
included mainly European “family members”, but it can be assumed that he was able to 
relate this concept to a Confucian world order.) Also, the emperor would not be able to 
exchange the treaty ratification with them personally, but he, Prince Gong, would do it 
in his stead. Regarding the hostages, he had no knowledge of the affair.85 This situation 
persisted for a few days: Prince Gong demanded the retreat of the allied forces while El-
gin and Gros demanded the return of the hostages, and meanwhile the troops advanced 
towards Beijing. Meanwhile, Prince Gong, despite the implications of international law 
and the question of the missing hostages, proceeded with his plans and had the treaty 
ready and translated by October 8. But Elgin and Gros still refused to sign because the 
hostages had not yet been returned, a difficulty which was not understandable to Prince 
Gong. It seemed to him incomprehensible that Elgin and Gros, having almost achieved 
their objectives, should stall now because of a few men, abducted during an incident 
regarding which he, Prince Gong, had no knowledge.
In the course of the next days, several things happened that both sped up the process and 
caused the conflict to escalate. Between October 6 and 9, European troops looted the Yu-
anming Yuan (the looting was started by the French, the British followed the next day), 
and confiscated many of its treasures. The theft of works of art was considered legitimate 
during the China War of 1860 and was only banned in 1954 by the Hague Convention. 
But since the looting of the Yuanming Yuan greatly endangered the negotiations, it must 
be classified as an escalation and loss of discipline among the French troops.86 The Eu-
ropean hostages, some of them mutilated and dead, were found there and freed and the 
dead bodies recovered. The British general Hope Grant declared the looted goods from 
the Yuanming Yuan as war booty and made his officers hand over all the goods they had 
taken to him since they belonged rightfully to Queen Victoria. On October 10 and 11, 
the looted goods from the Yuanming Yuan were auctioned off among the British officers 
in front of the Lama temple, near the city.87 The French general also declared the goods 
looted by the French as prizes of war and shipped a large part of them back to France as 
gift for Empress Eugénie, while also letting his men keep their individual “treasure”.
Meanwhile, the European troops gathered in front of the city gate of Beijing, ready 
to attack. Prince Gong refused all responsibility for the death of the hostages. He also 
criticized Elgin and Gros for following such a belligerent course. On October 14, the 
city gate Andingmen was taken peacefully by the European troops, and the remaining 
85 Prince Gong to Elgin, September 27, FO 682/993/62.
86 A description of the act of looting can be found in A. Lucy, Lettres intimes sur la champagne de Chine, Marseille 
862, pp. 0ff. The Xianfeng Emperor first heard of these events on October 0. Memorial of Yixin, Guiliang and 
Wenxiang, in: Chouban Yiwu shimo (55). The Chinese eyewitnesses, who were very few, usually reported the 
burning of the Yuanming Yuan and only rarely mentioned this first looting at the beginning of October.
87 G. J. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China in 860, London 862, p. 240; R. Swinhoe, Narrative (59), p. 3.
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hostages were freed. Of thirty-nine hostages, twenty-six survived while thirteen had been 
killed. Prince Gong conceded to the demands for the Treaty of Beijing made by the 
British as well as the French. Elgin accepted, but felt obliged to additionally demand a 
financial indemnity for the families of the dead hostages. To underline the gravity of his 
demands, Elgin used means that would be in no way justified by an international law: he 
threatened that if Prince Gong did not agree to these demands by October 20, he would 
burn down all imperial palaces in Beijing. 
Baron Gros also had additional demands in the wake of the death of French hostages, 
and for France as the protective power of the Catholic Church, such as the return of 
the property of the Catholic Church in Beijing. Prince Gong answered the demands by 
granting them all. 
During the next few days, Lord Elgin proceeded to demonstrate to Prince Gong the 
opposite of what he had been trying to impress on him: that he belonged to a civi-
lized nation operating according to international law. By burning Yuanming Yuan to the 
ground, Lord Elgin (though he justified it by the remains of the dead hostages found 
there) proved that his talk of “international law” and “family of nations” was shallow and 
apparently not to be applied to China. On the contrary, he justified this act in London 
with the reasoning that he felt he had to teach the Qing government a “lesson” for mak-
ing the negotiations so difficult. He was thus conducting a civilizing mission with no 
civil content.88
Elgin also claimed that it had to be impressed on the Chinese government that foreign 
diplomats had to be granted immunity and could not be taken hostage. General de 
Montauban, although his soldiers looted heavily on October 6 and 7, did not participate 
in the final burning of the Yuanming Yuan, which he believed to be too severe a retalia-
tion. He rather suspected, wrongly, that Elgin was indeed attempting to take power from 
the Chinese emperor.89 The European powers however, had just demonstrated their bar-
barianism despite all their talk of a “civilizing mission”, free trade and Christian values.
Conclusion 
To come back to our question: how did the representatives of the Qing Empire and those 
of Great Britain and France come to terms with each other’s diplomatic systems, and 
were there processes of transcultural appropriation? 
Firstly, a process of mutual appropriation definitely took place and was necessary to 
conclude the treaties. The point of departure for the European allies, particularly the 
British, was the firm belief in their civilizing mission, free trade and their rights in seek-
ing to force the Chinese empire to bow to their principles. Initially, the British perceived 
88 Elgin to Prince Gong, October 6, Beijing, in FO 405/5, pp. 279ff. See also Elgin to Russell, October 25, in FO 
7/33.
89 H. Cordier, L’expédition de Chine (44), p. 398.
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the Qing Empire as not interested in bowing to their demands, as deliberately delaying 
the signing of the contract, and interpreted their actions accordingly, usually as hostile. 
Elgin, although becoming increasingly aware of the difficulties of the Qing Empire as the 
negotiations unfolded, performed nevertheless as an “incontrollably fierce barbarian”.90 
The question of whether Elgin and Gros had a full vision about an existing traditional 
tributary system cannot be answered in full, since no explicit reference is made in the 
texts. However, they understood the largest obstacles for the Qing government with 
respect to the signing of the treaties: their declining to accept other powers as equal or to 
allow diplomatic representation or free inland travel, as well as their refusal to send impe-
rial envoys and dispatching provincial governors instead. On the other hand, Elgin and 
Gros connected the fact that the Russian and American envoys traveled the prescribed 
routes with an existing tribute system and clearly reacted to it by deciding on their own 
route. 
That the British and French did not form a unified “West” and tried to act according to 
their own civilizing missions, in which the French represented the Christian mission and 
the British defended notions of free trade, surfaced on only two occasions: firstly, when 
the French demanded less indemnity than the British at the beginning of the negotia-
tions, and secondly, when Baron Gros and General de Montauban refused to participate 
in the burning of the Yuanming Yuan at the end of October, but instead reclaimed all the 
Catholic churches and buildings in Beijing for France. They certainly would have liked 
to pronounce their “civility” more, but during the diplomatic negotiations Baron Gros 
often had no choice and had to follow the lead of Lord Elgin, who had, due to his much 
stronger troops, a considerable advantage.
The point of departure for the Qing government at large was the traditional tributary 
system, which had developed during the eighteenth century. The Qing Empire, multi-
national and multi-lingual (Han China being just one part of it), ruled during the eigh-
teenth century with a very flexible set of diplomatic practices that allowed them to also 
integrate the European traders at the southern fringes of the empire. Peace was main-
tained through a very strong army, through administrative practices, through the impres-
sive sage-like behavior of the emperor, or through keeping foreign traders at the borders 
and pacifying them by meeting their economic demands. Although facing a multitude 
of crises in the mid-nineteenth century, particularly rebellion at the fringes of the em-
pire and erosion of this tributary system, the imperial court at large, with the exception 
of a small faction around Prince Gong, the younger brother of the Xianfeng Emperor, 
refused to adapt this system to the demands of the Europeans, who wished for access 
and diplomatic representation in Beijing. The China War of 1860 shows for the first 
time a direct conflict between these two diplomatic systems. Both parties had to avoid 
war: Elgin and Gros had been instructed accordingly in Europe and had the difficult 
task of accommodating the interests of the aggressive British and French empires and at 
90 Letter from Elgin to his wife, June 5, 860, in: T. Walrond (ed.), Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of Elgin, 
London 872, p. 25.
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the same time not endangering the legitimation of the government of the Qing Empire, 
which was in a multitude of crises.
In the end, the negotiations came to a conclusion only because the first set of Qing nego-
tiators, opposing the Europeans and their access to China and acting in accordance with 
the Xianfeng Emperor, was replaced by Prince Gong, who acted on behalf of the em-
peror after his flight to Chengde. But also during the first part of the negotiations, both 
parties had to deviate from their initial demands. The first party of the Qing government 
acted in accordance with traditional diplomatic customs: they refused diplomatic repre-
sentation in Beijing, inland travel, indemnity and an apology for the events in 1859, as 
well as direct contact with imperial officials. Elgin and Gros insisted on their demands, 
but offered not to take up the embassies immediately, instead deferring this to the fol-
lowing year. Also, they ensured that a personal encounter with the emperor remained 
negotiable. The Qing officials deviated from their customs insofar as they sent imperial 
princes to negotiate with Elgin and Gros, which means that they recognized the wish of 
the foreigners to negotiate with high-ranking imperial officials.
Only during the third phase of the negotiations, and after Prince Gong had taken them 
over, did the full scale of deviation from the tributary system become apparent. Origi-
nally attempting to ignore the diplomatic dimension of the European demands and 
pretending to understand them in purely economic terms, Prince Gong eventually had 
to grant the diplomatic representation. At the same time, he had to appropriate and in-
tegrate European diplomatic customs, like diplomatic immunity, the exchange of ratified 
treaties, and the fact that Europeans wanted to deal only with imperial commissioners (a 
fact that had already been conceded by his predecessors).
Elgin and Gros, who were able to act much more in accordance than the Qing govern-
ment, had to concede only the fact that the embassies would be taken up in the following 
year.
The question of international law was raised only during the last phase of the negotia-
tions, when Elgin was in contact with Prince Gong, who seemed to have a much better 
grasp of the worldview of the British and the French than did his predecessors. Elgin 
explained it as underlying the system of his diplomatic negotiations but remained rather 
hazy about it, and only certain rules were mentioned to Prince Gong. Prince Gong, how-
ever, followed up on it, and Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law was among 
the first books translated into Chinese in the aftermath of the war. But the international 
law unfolded as a major relevance in connection with the fate of the abduction of a high-
ranking delegation of European diplomats. In order to guarantee the safety of further 
diplomats in China and to make the point that their taking hostages was not an option 
for further negotiations, Elgin explained the concept of “diplomatic immunity” within 
the framework of international law. When some of the hostages were returned mutilated 
and dead, Elgin retaliated using the reason that this was a violation of international law 
and so put the Yuanming Yuan to the torch. 
Eventually Prince Gong had to acknowledge during the negotiations not only the ex-
istence of a European diplomatic system, but particularly the fact that the British and 
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French empires wanted to be accepted as equal. Additionally, this European system em-
ployed its own notion of what underlay all political entities in the form of an interna-
tional law. In the end, the Qing government was able to suffer the humiliation of the 
burning of the Yuanming Yuan without losing all legitimacy of rule over China. With the 
emperor gone to Jehol, it became possible to follow a path of foreign policy that included 
other types of diplomatic worldviews.
The Zongli Yamen, from this perspective, certainly is a transcultural institution. By es-
tablishing the Zongli Yamen, the Chinese government integrated international law as a 
transcultural element and technique of governance.
In the years to come, the Qing court took many measures to improve its situation, in-
cluding even the help and technology of the Westerners. On the other side, during this 
phase until the 1890s, the interest of the Westerners and Europeans was always to stabi-
lize the Qing government insofar as they were able to accommodate Western interests.
Under these premises, it seems, theories of informal empires still remain a valid frame-
work of interpretation. But the approach of entangled histories and the analysis of trans-
culturality show, as in the case of the China War of 1860, that an informal empire was 
also a constant process of negotiation and renegotiation, and that the Chinese govern-
ment indeed initiated the most important reforms themselves. 
